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Articles
THE LEGALIZATION OF SAME-GENDER SEXUAL INTIMACY
IN MARYLAND

by Dwight H. Sullivan, Michael Adams, and Martin H. Schreiber II
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminalizing sexual intimacy is an unwarranted
invasion of personal liberty. Government simply has
no legitimate interest in prohibiting private, noncommercial intimate sexual activity between consenting
adults. The Annotated Code of Maryland appears to
violate this principle by subjecting those engaged in
certain common acts of sexual intimacy to up to ten
years in prison. Article 27, section 554 ofthe Annotated
Code of Maryland makes it a crime for a person to
"tak[e] into his or her mouth the sexual organ of any
other person," or to "plac[e] his or her sexual organ in
the mouth of any other person."1 That section also
prohibits "any other unnatural or perverted sexual
practice with any other person."2 Further, Article 27,
section 553 outlaws "sodomy,"3 or anal sex.
If these statutes were to be applied literally, they
would criminalize acts that the vast majority of

I MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1996). Violations of this codal section
are punishable by a fine of up to $1,000, confinement for up to ten
years, or both. [d. Oral sex was first made a crime under Maryland law
in 1916. SeeSchochetv. State, 320Md. 714, 733 n.5, 580A.2d 176,185
n.5 (1990).

2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1996). This section makes it a crime to
"take[ ] into his or her mouth the sexual organ of any other person or
animal. .. or.... commit[] any other unnatural or perverted sexual
practice with any other person or animal ...." [d. A violation of this
statute is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or confinement for up
to ten years. [d.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 553 (1996). Sodomy is punishable by
confinement for up to ten years. [d.. This section traces its roots to a
1793 statute. See 1793 Md. Laws ch. 57, § 10. At common law, the
offense of "crimes against nature" was "narrowly limited to copUlation
per anum." See Rosev. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 53 (1975). "Most American
jurisdictions," however, "have expanded the definition of sodomy to
include contact between mouth and genitals." See RICHARD A. POSNER
& KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA's SEX LAWS 65 (1996).
See generally Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crjme
& the Constitutjon, 30 J. FAM. L. 45 (1991); Jeremy D. Weinstein,
Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 195,
201-25 (1986).
3

Americans - and, presumably, Marylanders - practice. 4
The Court of Appeals of Mary land's 1990 ruling in
Schochet v. State,S however, e~empted private, noncommercial, consensual heterosexual oral sex from the
reach of Maryland's criminal law. But that ruling left
same-gender couples who practice oral or anal sex
vulnerable to prosecution, while also creating
uncertainty over the permissibility of prosecuting
heterosexual couples who engage in anal sex.
A 1999 ruling by the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City has largely corrected Schochet 's limitations. In the
wake of Williams v. State,6 all Marylanders may now
engage in private, non-commercial, consensual sexual
intimacy without fear ofprosecution. The Williarm decision
is in line with a recent trend toward eliminating archaic sex
laws, which has left only a minority of states with operable
sodomy statutes. 7
While advancing gay and lesbian rights, as well as
signifying a victory for the privacy rights ofall Marylanders,
the Williams ruling stopped short of completely
decriminalizing the field of sexual intimacy. Williams
forecloses prosecution of private, non-commercial,
See JUNE M. REINISCH, THE KINSEY INSTITUTE NEW REpORT ON SEX 132
(1990) (noting that a "study reported that more than 90 percent of
married couples younger than 25 had engaged in oral sex" while another
"study of more than 100 heterosexual couples of all ages reported a
similar percentage"); see also JAMES PATTERSON & PETER KIM, THE DAY
AMERICA TOLD THE TRUTH 81 (1991)(finding that 79 percent of the men
and 70 percent of the women surveyed had engaged in oral sex and 40
percent of the men and 34 percent of the women surveyed had engaged
in anal sex).
4

~

320 Md. 714,580 A.2d 176 (1990).

6No. 980360311CC-I059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (BaIt. City Cir. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1998).
Only eighteen states and Puerto Rico now have operable sodomy
statutes, five of which apply only to same-gender partners. American
Civil Liberties Union, Status of u.s. Sodomy Laws (last modified Jan.
1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/sodomy.html>. In one ofthose
eighteen states, Louisiana, a Court of Appeal decision recently struck
down the sodomy statute to the extent that it prohibited non-commercial,
consensual, private sexual behavior. See State v. Smith, No. 97-KA7
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consensual sex acts themselves, but leaves open the
possibility of prosecuting someone merely for asking
another adult to engage in such legal acts. This article will
discuss the implications of Schochet and Williams and
suggest approaches for completing the decriminalization
ofintimate sexual activity in Maryland.

II. SCHOCHET V. STATE
Steven Adam Schochet was tried in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County for allegedly forcing a
woman to engage in several sex acts with him in her
apartment. 8 Schochet admitted to having sex with the
woman, including an act of fellatio, but maintained that
she had consented. 9 The jury apparently believed
Schochet, acquitting him of all of the charged forcible
sex acts.1O The judge, however, had declined the
defense's request for an instruction that consent was a
defense to the oral sex charge. I I In light of the judge's
instructions and Schochet's own admission that the
alleged victim had performed fellatio on him, it is hardly
surprising that the jury found him guilty of violating
the "unnatural and perverted sexual practices" statute. 12

1393, 1999 WL 74614 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1999); see also Louisiana
Electorate of Gays and Lesbians v. State of Louisiana, No. 94-9260
(Orleans Civ. Dist. Parish Ct. March 17, 1999). Other recent decisions
striking down sodomy statutes include Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18
(Ga. 1998); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997)
(invalidating sodomy statute under state constitutional right to privacy);
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S. W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996) (invalidating
sodomy statute under state constitution); and Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
8 See Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 717-18, 580 A.2d 176, 177-78
(1990). Schochet was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the
second degree, first and second degree sexual offenses for engaging in
forcible oral and anal intercourse, sodomy, and unnatural and perverted
sexual practices. [d.

See id. at 720-21, 580 A.2d at 179. Schochet, however, denied engaging
in anal intercourse. [d. at 721, 580 A.2d at 179.

9

\0 See id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180. The jury also acquitted him of the
sodomy charge. [d.

Schochet appealed his conviction to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, arguing that the United
States Constitution prohibits the criminalization of
"private and noncommercial sexual acts between
consenting heterosexual adults."13 The court of special
appeals affirmed Schochet's conviction by a two-to-one
decision. Judge Moylan, joined by Judge Garrity, held
that the United States Constitution provides no
"protection for sexual activity - orthodox or
unorthodox, heterosexual or homosexual - at least
outside of marriage."14 Judge Wilner, in dissent,
concluded that both the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights l5 protected Schochet from
prosecution for engaging in private, consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual fellatio. 16
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
Schochet's certiorari petition and, in a maj ority opinion
written by Judge Eldridge, overturned Schochet's
conviction without reaching the constitutional issue.
Rather than siding with the court of special appeals
majority or dissent, the court of appeals narrowly
construed the unnatural and perverted sexual practices
statute to exclude acts of consensual, private, noncommercial, heterosexual oral sex from its scope.
The court of appeals initially noted that "very
strong arguments, based on Supreme Court decisions
and language in Supreme Court opinions, can be made
on both sides of the constitutional right to privacy issue
presented here."17 These conflicting arguments resulted

13 Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 315, 317, 541 A.2d 183, 183-84
(1988).
14

See id. at 339,541 A.2d at 195.

IS Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, "That no
man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner,
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the Law of the land." The Court of Appeals has
indicated that Article 24 is coextensive with the u.S. Constitution's
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Lodowski v. State, 307
Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986).

II

See id. at 722 & n.3, 580 A.2d at 180 & n.3.

16 See Schochet, 75 Md. App. at 362-63, 541 A.2d at 206-07 (Wilner,
1., dissenting).

12

See id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180.

17

29.2 U. Balt L.F. 16

See Schochet, 320 Md. at 726,580 A.2d at 181.

Articles
in a "significant division" among courts "addressing the
constitutionality ofpmrishing consensual, heterosexual acts
between consenting adults in private ...."18 The Maryland
court cited seven cases supporting a constitutional right to
engage in such conduct, 19 while citing an additional six
cases for the opposite view. 20 The majority concluded
that ''the approximately even division among appellate
courts reinforces our conclusion that the constitutional issue
here presented is a very difficult one. "21
Next, the court analyzed whether the language of
Article 27, section 554 could be narrowly construed
to avoid the constitutional question. Chief Judge
Murphy's dissent argued that the oral sex statute does
not permit a limiting construction because its
"all-encompassing language was plainly intended to
reach those 'unnatural' or 'perverted' sexual practices,
therein so vividly described, without exception."22 The
majority, however, rejected this argument, expressly
relying on the "very broad and sweeping" language of
section 554 to conclude that "[t]he statute's silence
concerning the matters of consent, privacy, marriage,
etc., creates legitimate questions regarding the reach
of the statute."23
The court of appeals also surveyed its own case
law involving sections 553 and 554,24 noting that "many
cases in this Court involving §§ 554 or 553 have been
prosecutions for homosexual activity ,"25 "prosecutions
for sexual acts with minors,"26 and prosecutions for
sexual activity "in places which could not be considered
'private. "'27 But "none has been a prosecution based
on consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity

between adults in the privacy ofthe home. "28
Ultimately, the court held that under the circumstances
of the case, section 554 did not apply; therefore, the
conviction had to be reversed. 29 Schochet's net effect
was to legalize heterosexual oral sex and throw into doubt
the continued crimina1ization ofheterosexual anal sex, while
leaving acts of same-gender oral and anal sex open to
prosecution.

III. WILLIAMS V. STATE

A. Attacking the Prohibition Against Same-Gender
Oral Sex
In the wake of Schochet, some Maryland law
enforcement agencies continued vigorous application of
section 554 to gay men, including arrests for invitations to
go to private places to engage in consensual,
non-commercial oral sex.30 Following one such
undercover sting operation designed to arrest men for
soliciting other men to engage in oral sex, the American
Ci viI Liberties Union filed a challenge to section 554' s
application to private, non-commercial, consensual, samegender oral sex. 31 The suit challenged the use of Section
15(e) of Article 27,32 which prohibits solicitation "for the

28 !d.
29
18

Id.

19

See id. at 726-27, 580 A.2d at 181-82.

20

See id. at 727,580 A.2d at 182.

21

Id. at 728,580 A.2d at 183.

at 734, 580 A.2d at 185.

See id. at 735,580 A.2d at 186.

2' Schochet, 320 Md. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184.

See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to State Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A, Williams v. State, No. 980360311CC-l 059,
1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (Bait. City Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement of
probable cause indicating that a defendant was arrested under section
15(e) for inviting an undercover police officer "to come to his house" to
engage in oral sex). See generally PJ. Shuey, Dozens Busted/or Lewdness
at Adult Store, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Aug. 12, 1997, at BI. The
stigmatizing effect of an Anne Arundel County sting operation was
heightened by the Capital's publication of the names and addresses of
those arrested, including both an elementary school principal and a
prominent U.S. Navy officer. See Navy Chief's Aide Charged in Sex
Sting, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Aug. 13, 1997, at D 1.

26Id. at 731,580 A.2d at 185.

31

See Williams, at *2.

32

See id.

3()

22!d. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
23

Id. at 729,580 A.2d at 183.

24

Id. at 731-34, 580 A.2d at 184-85.

27

Id.

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 17
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purpose of ... lewdness,"33 to criminalize a request to
engage in such a private, non-commercial, consensual sex
act.
The plaintiffs in Williams included four gay men and
a lesbian who wished to engage in private intimate activity
and who feared prosecution under Maryland law. 34 One
ofthese such plaintiffs had already been previously arrested
for inviting an undercover police officer to engage in a
private sex act. 35 The final plaintiff was a taxpayer who
objected to the use of her tax dollars to enforce statutes
crimina1izing same-gender sexual intimacy.36
The plaintiffs based their challenge on both privacy
and equal protection principles. The privacy arguments
advanced called for a reinterpretation offederal privacy
law and a more expansive reading of Maryland privacy
law. 37 For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,38 the
Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution
does not preclude states from criminalizing
same-gender sex acts.39 Through its decision in Romer
v. Evans,4o however, the Supreme Court had cast some
doubt over Bowers' continued vitality.41 Thus, the
Williams privacy challenge could have allowed the
Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit Bowers. The
Williams case also presented the Maryland Court of

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 15(e) (1996). Section 15 provides, "[i]t
shall be unlawful: ... (e) To procure or to solicit or offer to procure or
solicit for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness or assignation." A
violation of this statute is punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or
confinement for up to one year. See id. at § 17.

33

34

See Williams, at *2, 3.

3S

See id.

36

See id. at *3.

37

See id. at *15.

38

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

39

See id. at 190-91.

Appeals with an opportunity to find that the Maryland
Declaration of Rights includes a broad privacy right
that protects same-gender sexual activity.
On the other hand, the equal protection claims
raised unresolved questions of whether the federal or
state constitutions prohibit the criminalization of
same-gender intimate activity that is legal for married
or unmarried heterosexual couples. The equal
protection challenge under the United States
Constitution was bolstered by the Supreme Court's
holding in Romer v. Evans, which adopted a "muscular
rational basis"42 standard to review laws that draw
distinctions on the basis of sexual orientationY The
complaint also raised a challenge under Article 46 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights (the state Equal
Rights Amendment), which provides that "[e]quality
of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied
because of sex."44 At its most basic level, the
criminalization of only same-gender oral sex acts
appears to violate the equal rights guarantee. For
example, imagine two people, A and B, engaged in an
act of oral sex. Assume A is a man. Under Schochet' s
interpretation of section 554, the sex act is legal ifB is
a woman, but illegal ifB is a man. B's gender alone
determines the act's legality, thus raising serious equal
protection concerns under Article 46. 45
The defendants in Williams, who included both
State of Maryland and Anne Arundel County officials,
moved to dismiss the complaint. The crux of the
defendants' argument was that the plaintiffs did not
have standing to challenge section 554's applicability
to private, non-commercial consensual same-gender
oral sex because the statute was never enforced against

Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle
Transformation in Judicial Arguments over Gay Rights, 1996 WIS. L.
REv. 893, 966.

42

40

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

See Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO.
L. REv. 373 (1997). See also Nabozny v. Podlesney, 92 F.3d 446, 458
n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Of course Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the
area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v.
Evans, [517 U.S. 620 (1996)].").

43

See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.

44

Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. 46.

41

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 18

See Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) (holding that
the cause of action for criminal conversation, which was available to a
husband whose wife committed adultery, but not to a wife whose
husband committed adultery, violated Article 46).

4S
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such activity. 46 However, the defendants also offered a
fall-back argument that would prove crucial to the
case's resolution. The Attorney General's office argued
on behalf of the State defendants that if the court
determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
sections 1547 and 554, "it should construe those statutes
so as not to apply to private, consensual,
non-commercial homosexual activity."48 In Schochet,
the court of appeals had already narrowed section 554
to exclude "consensual, non-commercial, heterosexual
activity between adults in the privacy of the home. "49
In essence, the defendants asked the circuit court to
narrow Schochet's construction of section 554 still
further "by striking the word heterosexual from the
holding."50
In light of the defendants' proposed limiting
construction, the outcome of the case would depend
almost entirely on the standing issue. After receiving
briefs and hearing oral arguments, Judge Richard T.
Rombro of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held
that the plaintiffs did, indeed, have standing to challenge
the statutes. 51 While noting that a criminal statute's
mere existence is insufficient to provide standing,52 the
court found that "Plaintiffs' concern goes beyond the
mere existence of a criminal statute."53 Judge Rombro
pointed to the possibility that a conviction for violating

46

See Williams, at *8.

47

See supra note 33.

Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
5, Williams v. State, No. 980360311CC-1059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260
(Bait. City Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998). The defendants maintained that if
the court construed the statute in this manner, it should dismiss the
suit. See id. at 6. While embracing the proposed statutory construction,
the plaintiffs countered that the court should adopt the defendants'
proffered construction by issuing an injunction and a declaratory
judgment. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to State
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 24.

the challenged statutes could jeopardize the licenses of
those plaintiffs who are lawyers, thus threatening their ability
to earn a living. 54 The court also noted that a conviction
could threaten the plaintiffs' ability to serve as personal
representatives of their partners' estates. 55 The court
observed that twenty-four separate State's Attorneys had
discretion to decide how to enforce the challenged
statutes,56 thus making it impossible to know how each of
those officeholders and their successors would choose to
enforce those sections. 57 Accordingly, the court found
that it could not say that the plaintiffs' subjective fear of
prosecution was merely imagined, and that the challenge
presented "a justiciable issue, ripe for resolution."58
After resolving the question of standing, the court
considered the proper scope of section 5 54. In a ringing
endorsement of the principle that individuals should
be treated equally regardless of their sexual orientation,
Judge Rombro opined, "[i]t cannot be doubted, as
Defendants concede, that there would be an equal
protection violation if acts, considered not criminal
when committed by a heterosexual couple, could be
prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple.
There is simply no basis for the distinction."59 Judge
Rombro then offered an analogy to support his
conclusion: "[0]ne group may drive at 60 miles per
hour, but another would be prosecuted for driving at a
speed greater than 50 miles per hour. Merely to state
such a hypothesis is to show its constitutional
infirmity."60 Thus, "in order to avoid serious
constitutional issues,"61 the court held that section 554
"does not encompass consensual, non-commercial,

48

49

Schochet , 320 Md. 714, 731, 580 A.2d 176, 184 (1990).

50

Williams, at *21-22.

54

See id. at *14.

See id. See also LaGrange v. Hinton, 91 Md. App. 294, 603 A.2d
1385 (1992) (holding that a person convicted of violating section 554
is ineligible to serve as an executor or administrator of a will).

55

56 See id. at *14.
57 See

id. at * 14-15.

58Id
51

See id. at *15.
59Id at *22.

See id. at *13 (quoting Hitchock v. Kloman, 196 Md. 351, 356, 76
A.2d 582, 584 (1950».
-

6°Id

53Id

61Id. (quoting Schochet).

52

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 19
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heterosexual or homosexual activity between adults in
private."62

B. Extending the Court's Ruling to the Prohibition
Against Anal Sex
Less than nine months after Williams was filed,
the court ruled that Maryland's criminal law should
not make distinctions based on sexual orientation.
While that ruling was an enormous step forward, it
applied only to section 554, which governs oral sex,
and not to section 553, which governs anal sex. In the
wake of Schochet and the initial Williams opinion,
section 553' s continued applicability to both
heterosexual and same-gender private, noncommercial, consensual anal sex was unclear.
To resolve this continued uncertainty as to section
553' s scope, the plaintiffs negotiated an agreement
under which the defendants consented to the circuit
court's extension of its Williams ruling to section 553
as well. That extension fit well within the legal
framework established by Schochet and the initial
Williams opinion. While the Schochet court did not
directly construe section 553, because Schochet had
been acquitted of the sodomy charge,63 the Schochet
decision's rationale seems to apply to section 553 as
well as to section 554. In finding that section 554's
application to private, consensual, non-commercial
heterosexual sexual activity would raise constitutional
doubt, the court of appeals pointed to seven cases
invalidating or limiting other states' statutes
criminalizing private sexual activity.64 Six of those
seven statutes prohibited not only oral sex, but also
sodomy as defined by section 553. Additionally, since
62Id.
63

See supra notes 10-11.

Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 726-27, 580 A.2d 176, 181-82 (1990)
(citing State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); People v. Onofre,
415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okl. Crim.
App. 1986), Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Penn. 1980);
Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968) (concluding that
application of Indiana's sodomy statute to marital sexual acts raises
substantial constitutional questions), Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F.
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J.
1977».

64

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 20

the court of appeals decided Schochet in 1990, several
other states' sodomy laws had also been judicially
invalidated. 65 Thus, the constitutional doubt regarding
application of section 554 to private, non-commercial,
consensual sexual activity also envelops the application
of section 553 to anal sex.
At the request ofthe parties in Williams, the circuit
court agreed to extend its initial ruling to include section
553 as well as section 554. 66 Accordingly, the court
resolved the Williams case by declaring "that Article
27, Sections 553 and 554 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland do not apply to consensual, non-commercial,
private sexual activities .... "67 The court also enjoined
the defendants - including the State of Maryland and
its employees - from enforcing those sections in cases
of consensual, non-commercial, private sexual
activity. 68 This injunction gives the Williams ruling
statewide effect due to the fact that every prosecutor
in Maryland is a state employee. 69
The importance of the Williams ruling lies in two
aspects that reach beyond the court of appeals'
Schochet holding. First, while Schochet construed
section 554 to exclude acts of private, non-commercial,
consensual heterosexual oral sex,7° the Williams ruling
expands the exception to apply to same-gender oral
sex acts as well. 71 Second, the Schochet holding, though
not necessarily its rationale, was limited to section
554.72 The Williams ruling, however, applies to section

6S

See supra note 7.

66

See Williams, at *1.

67Id.
61

See id.

See Valle v. Pressman, 229 Md. 591,600, 185 A.2d 368,374 (1962)
(holding that a State's Attorney is a state, rather than local, official).
The Attorney General, another state official, is responsible for handling
criminal appeals for the prosecution. See Md. Const. art. V, § 3(a)(I).

69

70See

Schochet, 320 Md. at 734,580 A.2d at 186.

71

See Williams, at *25

72

See Schochet, 320 Md. at 734, 580 A.2d at 186.
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553 as well as section 554. 73 Williams thus largely
decriminalizes private consensual sexual activity in
Maryland.
IV. THE CONTINUED CRIMINALIZATION OF
SOLICITATION
Even after Williams, Maryland's criminal law still
improperly intrudes into one area of personal
relationships: requests to engage in intimate activity.
The Williams plaintiffs had challenged application of
Maryland's solicitation statute - Article 27, section
15(er4 - to requests to engage in private, noncommercial, consensual sex acts. This challenge was
based on the proposition that "once private intimate
activity is recognized as legal, a request to engage in
that activity cannot be criminal."75 In rejecting this
argument, Judge Rombro reasoned that the court of
appeals' "Schochet decision held that acts between
consenting adults which were conducted in private are
not criminal. An unwanted solicitation is neither private
nor consensual."76 The circuit court found that "the
varied ramifications of solicitation make it inappropriate
for a court to declare such a statute facially
unconstitutional."77 The court contended that legal
distinctions arise according to "whether the solicitation
occurs in a bar, gay or straight, [or] in a shopping mall.
In the latter case, there is involved an element of
harassment and nuisance: cases arising from that set of
facts usually come about because of merchant
complaints that their customers have received
unwelcome overtures."78 That assertion, nevertheless,
is open to doubt; in many arrests for solicitation in

public places, the "victims" are undercover police officers
purposely creating an impression that they desire to be
solicited. 79
Regardless of the accuracy of the court's empirical
assessment, not every annoyance is-or should besubject to criminal prosecution. A man who approaches
a woman at a bar, on a street comer, or in a park and
suggests that they go to his home to engage in sexual
intercourse may be guilty of boorish behavior, but he
is not guilty of a crime. If a man approaches another
man and suggests that they go to his home to engage
in oral or anal sex, he is guilty of a crime. The law then
violates the equal protection rationale that was crucial
to the Williams ruling interpretation of section 554.
The circuit court was wrong, then, in maintaining that
section 15 ( e) "prohibits solicitation by either
homosexuals or heterosexuals. "80 Contrary to the
court's insistence that "one segment of society is not
singled out,"81 gay men appear to be the only targets
of prosecution under section 15(e) for asking someone
to engage in non-commercial intimacy. Moreover,
Judge Rombro's rationale does not address why the
state should be permitted to criminalize any discussion
of private sexual activity between adults, regardless of
whether the prohibition targets a specific group or
applies across-the-board. Unconstitutional restrictions
on free speech are not cured simply by applying them
indiscriminately.

s

See generally, Philip P. Pan, Pro George Judge Is Arrested in Restroom,
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1998, at CI; Justice Stanley Mosk, Project-The
Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L.
REv. 643, 690-94 (1966) (discussing police sting techniques); Larry CatA
Backer, Exposing the Perversions ofToleration: The Decriminalization
ofPrivate Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of
Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REv. 755, 778-79 (1992) (noting that
"enforcing laws suppressing certain forms of private consensual activity
... may create more crime than it prevents").

7')

73 See
74

Williams, at *1.

See supra note 33.

Williams, at *22-23 (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition
to State, at 22).

75

76Id. at *25.
77

Id

78Id

SU

Williams, at *24.
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The factor that should govern the legality ofa request
to engage in non-commercial sexual intimacy is not the
location of the request, but rather the proposed location
ofthe act. Ifan individual solicits an adult to go to a private
place to engage in a non-commercial sex act, then the
requested act should be legal. Conversely, if an individual
solicits an adult to engage in a sex act in a public place,
such as a shopping mall restroom, then the requested act
may constitute indecent exposure and, ifso, may therefore
be subject to punishment. 82
Criminalizing requests -- even requests in public
places -- to engage in private sexual activity would present
a serious constitutional question. The First Amendment&3
simply does not allow the criminalization of pure speech
for the purpose ofproposing a legal activity,84 at least absent
a harassment element, which section 15(e) lacks. That
principle is consistent with the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in People v. Uplinger, which
considered a statute that criminalized loitering "in a public
place for the purpose of engaging, or soliciting another
person to engage, in deviate sexual intercourse or other
sexual behavior of a deviate nature. "85 The New York
court invalidated the statute, reasoning that "[i]nasmuch
as the conduct ultimately contemplated by the loitering
statute may not be deemed criminal, we perceive no basis
upon which the State may continue to punish loitering for
that purpose. "86
Therefore, applying section 15(e) to requests to
engage in private, non-commercial, consensual sex acts
presents a serious constitutional issue that can be avoided
simply by construing section 15(e) to exclude requests to
engage in such conduct. Indeed, the statutory construction

H2 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27. § 335A (1996).
This section makes
"indecent exposure" a crime punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or
confinement for up to three years. Id.

H3

See U.S. CON ST. amend. I.

K41d.
HI 447 N.E.2d 62, 62 (N.Y. 1983) (quoting PENAL LAW § 240.35. subd.
3).
HI.

Id. at 63.
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rule of in pari materia87 offers the best interpretation of
section 15(e). In applying this concept, section 15(e)
prohibits solicitation to commit "lewdness." Section 16,
in tum, defines "lewdness" as "any unnatural sexual
practice."88 Section 554's title is "Unnatural or perverted
sexual practices." Accordingly, even absent any
constitutional difficulties arising from the criminalization of
pure speech, the most logical interpretation ofsection 15(e)
is that it prohibits only requests to engage in activities that
are illegal under section 554. 89 Under Williams, section
554 "do[es] not apply to consensual, non-commercial,
private sexual activities."90 Hence, a request to engage in
such activity is not a solicitation of "lewdness" as that
term is defined under Maryland law.

v.

STATUTORY REVISION

While the Williams ruling brings Maryland in line
with the majority of states by legalizing private
consensual intimate activity, the ruling is in danger of
being overlooked. Because the case was resolved at
the circuit court level without an appeal, the decision will
not appear in Michie's Annotated Code ofMaryland. The
opinion is available via LEXIS, but only in the GENFED
library's EXTRA file. In time, police agencies, state's
attorneys, and evenjudges may become unfamiliar with
the Williams ruling, thus risking law enforcement activity
enjoined by Williams.

See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcnON § 51
(5th ed. 1992). The rule of in pari materia provides that where two
statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be construed
together. This rule of statutory construction is well established under
Maryland law. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d
675,679 (1994).

H7

HH MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 16 (1996). This section describes the terms
"prostitution," "lewdness," and "assignation" as follows: (I) prostitution
- "the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire,"
(2) lewdness - "any unnatural sexual practice," (3) assignation - "the
making of any appointment, or engagement for prostitution or lewdness
or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement."

This proposed construction does not conflict with In re Appeal No.
180,278 Md. 443, 365 A.2d 540 (1976), which broadly construes section
IS's use of the word "solicit." Rather than interpreting the word
"solicit," this proposed construction limits those acts that constitute
"lewdness."
H9

')11

Williams, at *1.
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To ensure that Maryland law is applied consistently
with the State's own recommended interpretation in
Williams, the Article 27 Revision Comrnittee91 should
propose either modifying sections 15(e), 553, and 554to
exclude private, non-commercial, consensual sex acts or,
in the alternative, abolishing sections 553 and 554
altogether while deleting the word "lewdness" from section
15(e). Maryland law has other provisions that criminalize
non-consensual sex acts,92 public sex acts, 93 and
commercial sex acts. 94 These provisions are sufficient to
regulate undesirable forms ofvaginal intercourse; no reason
exists to suspect that they are insufficient to regulate oral
and anal sex as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decriminalization of consensual sex in
Maryland began with the court of appeals decision in
Schochet. Williams has advanced the evolutionary
process begun by Schochet, but that evolution is not
yet complete. Maryland law now presents the anomaly
of certain forms of behavior enjoying greater protection
than the mere pure speech about those behaviors. This
anomaly could be cured by a judicial interpretation of
section 15(e) that narrows it to match the Schochet/
Williams framework. Alternatively, section 15(e) could
be narrowed legislatively in conjunction with a
codification of Schochet and Williams. Only then will
the bedrooms of the "Free State" truly be free.
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